The reality of Field's epistemological challenge to platonism Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that there are mathematical objects (such as numbers and sets) which are mind-and language-independent and neither spatiotemporally located nor causally active. Of the many philosophers who have suggested that platonism is epistemologically problematic, one of the most famous is Paul Benacerraf. In his 1973, Benacerraf tabled (but did not go so far as to endorse) an epistemological argument against platonism, based on the then-prominent causal theory of knowledge. That theory of knowledge has received much criticism, which is why few if any philosophers now endorse Benacerraf's argument. In the introduction to his 1989, and in earlier papers included in that collection, Hartry Field offered an epistemological challenge to platonism, which can be seen as a refinement of Benacerraf's. Justin Clarke-Doane (forthcoming 2016) argues that Field's challenge is an illusion: it does not pose a genuine problem for platonism. My aim is to show that Clarke-Doane's argument relies on a misunderstanding of Field's challenge. I begin by setting out Field's challenge, as I read it; I then explain how the argument Clarke-Doane discusses differs from Field's, and show that Field's actual argument is immune from ClarkeDoane's criticisms. Field (1989: 25-30, 68, 230-9) points out that platonists must accept that the mathematical beliefs of mathematicians are largely true. Call this phenomenon 'MMA', for 'mathematicians' mathematical accuracy'. According to Field, MMA 'is so striking as to demand explanation ' (1989: 26 To sum up: Field's challenge to platonism is that it seems impossible for any platonist theory to explain MMA. As Field puts it:
Recall that on the usual platonist picture, mathematical objects are supposed to be mindand language-independent; they are supposed to bear no spatio-temporal relations to anything, etc. The problem is that the claims that the platonist makes about mathematical objects appear to rule out any reasonable strategy for explaining the systematic correlation in question. (Field 1989: 231) Field takes it that this casts doubt on platonism (1989: 231) . It is worth noting that there is no mention of justification here: according to Field, inability to explain MMA is an embarrassment 3 for platonism because MMA is the sort of phenomenon which demands explanation (see
REFERENCE REMOVED).
Clarke-Doane presents Field's work very differently. On his reading, Field's argument can be summarized as follows:
(1) It seems impossible for us to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs (such as our belief that 2+3=5).
(2) If it seems impossible for us to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, then they are not epistemically justified.
(3) Therefore, our mathematical beliefs are not epistemically justified.
(Clarke-Doane states Field's argument in this fashion in the last paragraph of section 2, the first paragraph of section 6, and the first paragraph of section 8 of his paper.)
Clarke-Doane goes on to argue that there is no sense of 'explain the reliability' in which (2) and (3) both hold. He maintains that for any sense of 'explain the reliability', either our reliability is explicable, or our inability to explain it does not imply that our mathematical beliefs are unjustified (see sections 3 to 6 of his paper). Clarke-Doane therefore concludes that section 2). Clarke-Doane sees these problems as raised by ideology ('is prime', 'is good', etc.) rather than by ontology.
Why think that Field's argument is an argument against platonism? The text is clear:
Perhaps the most widely discussed challenge to the platonist position is epistemological. … Benacerraf's formulation of the challenge relied on a causal theory of knowledge which almost no one believes anymore; but I think that he was on to a much deeper difficulty with platonism….. Benacerraf's challenge -or at least, the challenge which his paper suggests to me-is to provide an account of the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about those remote entities can so well reflect the facts about them. The idea is that if it appears in principle impossible to explain this, then that tends to undermine the belief in mathematical entities, despite whatever reason we might have for believing in them. (Field 1989: 25-6, not to other domains, but to some philosophical accounts of other domains, specifically, those accounts which make it hard to explain the accuracy of our beliefs. The theory that our moral beliefs are largely true and concern moral values, conceived of as abstract objects, would thus be subject to a version of the challenge.)
A second difference is that Field's argument does not invoke the concept of justification, whereas on Clarke-Doane's reading the argument centrally involves this concept. Field is explicit that his challenge does not concern justification: 6 The way to understand Benacerraf's challenge, I think, is not as a challenge to our ability to justify our mathematical beliefs, but as a challenge to our ability to explain the reliability of those beliefs. (Field 1989: 25) Admittedly, Field's argument does concern justification in the sense that it aims to justify its conclusion, and thereby cast doubt on its negation. This is what Field has in mind with his talk of 'undermining' platonism, quoted above. In this sense, every argument concerns justification.
What I mean by saying that Field's argument does not concern justification is that the premises and conclusion of the argument can all be formulated without using the concept of justification.
Perhaps Clarke-Doane might respond by saying that if philosophers' belief in platonism is undermined, then so are the mathematical beliefs of people in general. We can set aside the matter of how plausible we should find this conditional, because proponents of Field's argument can happily concede it. Perhaps platonists' inability to explain the reliability of our people's mathematical beliefs does indeed undercut what justification those beliefs might otherwise have (testimonial justification, for instance). The point is that even if Field's claims have consequences for the epistemic standing of people's mathematical beliefs, that is not what his argument is meant to establish: rather, it is meant to cast doubt on a philosophical doctrine, namely, platonism.
Whilst I acknowledge that the argument which Clarke-Doane criticizes echoes some more recent statements of Field's (which Clarke-Doane cites), I take myself have shown that it differs from Field's 1989 argument in two significant ways. The import of these differences is clear. As I
